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Abstract
We experimentally study ways in which the social preferences of individuals
and groups a¤ect performance when faced with relative incentives. We also
identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in gener-
ating these e¤ects. We nd other-regarding workers tend to depress e¤orts by
15% on average. However, selsh workers are nearly three times more likely
to lead workers to coordinate on minimal e¤orts when communication is possi-
ble. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a team of workers has complex
consequences for organizational performance.
Keywords: Social Preferences, Relative Performance, Collusion, Leader-
ship
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1 Introduction
Relative performance incentives are a common feature of the workplace environment.
An interesting feature of relative pay is that a workers performance also a¤ects his
or her co-workerscompensation; in particular, it imposes a negative externality. An
increase in ones own performance will not only increase ones own compensation,
but inevitably also decrease a co-workers expected pay. How this externality a¤ects
the incentives of a worker will crucially depend on whether a worker incorporates
this reduction in her own e¤ort decision. It will also depend on other features of the
workplace environment.
In this paper, we explore the e¤ects of the social preferences of individuals and
group composition on their performance when they are faced with indenitely re-
peated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication
and leadership play in generating these e¤ects.
In particular, we use a controlled laboratory environment to examine two chan-
nels through which agents may reduce e¤ort under indenitely repeated relative in-
centives. The rst one is other-regardingconcerns: some agents may incorporate
other agentspayo¤s into their own e¤ort choice. Thus, other-regarding agents should
respond di¤erently to relative incentives compared to selshagents. Even though
the fact that individuals have heterogeneous degrees of other-regardingness (e.g., see
Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman, Kariv and Markovitz, 2007) is well-documented
in the literature, we know little about the e¤ect of other-regarding concerns on the
e¤ectiveness of relative performance incentives. Further, group composition in terms
of other-regarding concerns should also determine individual e¤ort in strategic inter-
actions such as relative performance pay. The second channel is indenitely repeated
relative incentives. Workplace interaction usually takes place for an indenite period
of time, so the shadow of the futuremay also a¤ect agents behavior (e.g., see Dal
Bó 2005). We consider this channel because concerns about future interactions may
also mediate the e¤ects of the social preference composition of the group.
The potential for sustained cooperation (or coordination, if we allow for multi-
plicity of equilibria) in indenitely repeated settings motivates the analysis of factors
that enable it. In this paper, we further explore the mediating role of communica-
tion and leadership on sustaining cooperation over time. Coordinating on low e¤orts
seems likely to be driven by the ease with which communication can happen (e.g.,
see Cooper et al. 1992). In addition, the potential for coordination in indenitely
repeated settings may stimulate leadership emergence (e.g., see Hermalin 2012). Al-
though leaders make mutually benecial outcomes focal in simple coordination games,
we know little about their e¤ect on agentsbehavior in indenitely repeated interac-
tions within a relative performance incentive structure. Leaders in this setting are
important since they can direct individuals towards low e¤ort outcomes and their
emergence may well be linked to social preferences.
In our experiment, we measure a proxy for subjectsother-regardingness using
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dictator games. We relate this proxy to their e¤ort and leadership decisions in groups
interacting repeatedly and indenitely under relative incentives. We randomly divide
subjects who have di¤erent levels of other-regardingness into groups and thus identify
the e¤ect of group composition on e¤ort. We also consider interactions without
communication (the baseline) and with communication, in order to explore the role
of verbal leadership on e¤ort outcomes.
Regardless of communication, we nd that groups with more other-regarding
workers tend to depress total e¤orts. At the individual level we nd that when com-
munication is not part of the work environment, each other-regarding group member
depresses overall e¤ort by 15%. Outcomes in which all group members depress ef-
forts, rarely occur in this case. Thus, our results are consistent with other-regarding
individuals internalizing the externality they impose without engaging in long-term
strategic behavior.
Communication is, of course, an important feature of many workplace settings. In
an indenitely repeated relative performance setting, communication can help workers
coordinate their e¤ort choices to their mutual benet. To facilitate such coordination
it is expected a leader will emerge. Here we use the term leader as a coordinator,
as argued by Kreps (1986) and Hermalin (2012). In our particular setting, we label
leaderas any individual who suggests that the group coordinate on minimal e¤ort
which is the Pareto optimal outcome from the agentsviewpoint. Controlling for the
emergence of this sort of leadership, we nd that with communication, other-regarding
subjects depress their e¤ort relative to selsh ones by 50%. We also nd that selsh
individuals are 2.7 times more likely than other-regarding individuals to successfully
lead their groups to the minimal e¤ort outcome.
This implies that the e¤ect of social preferences on work performance under rela-
tive incentives is complex. On the one hand, other-regarding workers have a tendency
to depress e¤ort, apparently through the internalizing of their e¤ortsnegative ex-
ternality. On the other hand, with the availability of communication, selsh workers
seem more likely to help direct the group to the lowest of e¤orts.
In order to eliminate possible confounds such as di¤erences in beliefs or degrees
of patience, in the nal treatment we have subjects face computerized simulated
subjects exhibiting choice behavior similar to that of past human subjects. Thus,
while strategic incentives are left intact, social preferences are turned o¤ in this
treatment. We nd suggestive evidence that by the end of the relative performance
stage, other-regarding and selsh subjects are indistinguishable.
We see the contributions of this paper as threefold. First, we document for the
rst time how individual social preferences a¤ect behavior when facing relative per-
formance incentives in indenitely repeated settings. Second, we explore how the
composition of a group in terms of individual social preferences a¤ects outcomes.
Third, we identify how communication and endogenous leadership mediate these ef-
fects as well as how social preferences relate to the emergence of coordinating leaders.
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2 Literature
The signicant body of literature that documents di¤erent degrees of social prefer-
ences (for example Andreoni and Miller, 2002; Fisman, Kariv and Markovitz, 2007;
DellaVigna, 2009) has led researchers to investigate their e¤ects on public good contri-
butions and other pro-social behaviors (e.g. Loch and Wu, 2008; Dreber, Fudenberg
and Rand, 2014; Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012; K½oszegi, 2014). Moreover, Fehr
and Fischbacher (2002) point out that when scholars disregard social preferences, they
fail to understand the determinants and consequences of incentives. In our paper,
we explore the e¤ects of social preferences on productivity in the setting of relative
performance incentives (e.g. see Kidd, Nicholas and Rai, 2013; Erkal, Gangadha-
ran, and Nikiforakis, 2011; Rey-Biel, Sheremeta, and Uler, 2012; and Riyanto and
Zhang, 2013). Similar to Gächter and Thöni (2005) and Fischbacher and Gächter
(2010) we use one game (a dictator game as in Andreoni and Miller, 2002) to predict
other-regarding concerns and relate those predictions to behavior in the relative per-
formance game. Although our relative performance game is similar to the dilemmas
used in those papers (i.e., players are better o¤ if they cooperatein low e¤orts), an
important di¤erence is that the interactions in our game are indenitely repeated
which is a common feature of many important settings, such as the workplace. For
indenitely repeated settings it is not clear a priori whether other-regarding concerns
will depress e¤orts due to internalizing the negative externality imposed on others or
will instead increase e¤orts due to more lenient punishment in the case of a devia-
tion, which makes sustaining a collusive outcome harder. Consequently, the e¤ects
of social preferences seen in indenitely repeated games could be quite di¤erent from
those captured through the other types of settings commonly found in the extant
literature.
The importance of group composition in a dimension other than the degree of
other-regardingness has been previously explored. Casas-Arce and Martinez-Jerez
(2009) for example, nd that relative performance incentives (tournaments in their
setting) are less e¤ective than piece rates when participants have heterogeneous abil-
ities. A similar result is found by Backes-Gellner and Pull (2013) in a sales contest
within a German insurance rm. To our knowledge, the e¤ect of group composi-
tion in terms of other-regardingness on e¤orts has not been explored, and yet there
have been studies that show that individual other-regardingness is important. For
example, Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005) allude to the role of social prefer-
ences in indenitely repeated (or at least long-term) interactions. Although the core
of Bandiera et al. (2005) is to compare workersproductivity under piece rate and
relative incentives, they also document two results that are related to this paper.
First, Bandiera et al. (2005) compare fruit pickers with the aforementioned incentive
schemes in two di¤erent settings: one that allows peer monitoring and another one
that does not. They nd that relative compensation leads to lower productivity only
when monitoring is allowed. They conclude that monitoring, not social preferences,
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drives down e¤ort in their setting. The authors keep their monitoring technology and
relative incentives constant throughout their study; they also do not exogenously vary
their subjectsexposure to altruism. Second, Bandiera et al. (2005) nd that workers
with social ties depress e¤ort. Social ties could capture social preferences; but they
could also capture the salience of punishment should one defect from low e¤orts.
As a result, although this study clearly showed that social ties can reduce e¤orts, it
is unclear whether social preferences can do the same. Our paper complements this
work by directly measuring participantssocial preferences (à la Andreoni and Miller,
2002) and randomly forming groups whose members have varying degrees of social
preferences to identify the link between social preferences and behavior, both as a
function of individual preferences and group composition.
Indenitely repeated settings have been another important area of research: Pareto
improvements over the one-shot Nash equilibrium can be obtained as equilibrium out-
comes if the value of the future is high enough.1 However, the fact that cooperation
(or collusion in the context of competition) can be an equilibrium outcome does
not guarantee that subjects will cooperate (Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011, 2014).2 In
fact, it has been documented that the majority of the time individuals do not achieve
the Pareto-optimal outcomes (e.g., Palfrey and Rosenthal 1994 nd cooperation rates
from 29% to 40% in public goods games, and Dal Bó (2005) found cooperation rates
of 38% in indenitely repeated prisoners dilemmas). Further, there has been a great
variety of outcomes in this literature, some of which deviate from standard economic
models (see Fudenberg, Rand, and Dreber, 2012). Our paper complements this work
by documenting the role of individual and group social preferences on outcomes in
indenitely repeated games.
Although theoretically cheap talk communication does not rule out equilibria,
empirically it has been found to facilitate coordination in indenitely repeated games
(Fonseca and Normann 2012; Embrey, Fréchette, and Stacchetti 2013). One channel
through which communication helps equilibrium selection in games of coordination
is through a leader, as argued by Kreps (1986) and Hermalin (2012). The theoreti-
cal economics literature on leadership has focused on how pre-imposed self-regarding
leaders coordinate (e.g. Bolton, Brunnermeier, and Veldkamp 2013), motivate (e.g.
Rotemberg and Saloner, 1993, 2000), and signal information through their actions
(e.g. Hermalin 1998). The role of leaders in these studies is to overcome individuals
incentives to act against the interest of the group. Meanwhile, the experimental lit-
erature has focused on whether leaders foster cooperation in social dilemmas, mostly
from Hermalins (1998) leading-by-example perspective. These studies have found
1Versions of this folk theorem can be found in Friedman (1971) or Fudenberg and Maskin
(1986).
2There is a fairly large experimental literature on collusion, mostly focused on exploring the e¤ect
of monitoring (see e.g. Aoyagi and Fréchette 2009; Du¤y and Ochs 2009) and strategic uncertainty
(see e.g. Blonski and Spagnolo 2004). Our focus is on the role of group composition in terms of social
preferences on cooperation. For an updated survey on cooperation in innitely repeated games see
Dal Bó and Fréchette (2014).
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that leaders indeed spur cooperation, often through reciprocity from followers.3 To
our knowledge one study, Koukoumelis, Levati, and Weisser (2012), explores leader-
ship through communication in a social dilemma. In their study, the authors exoge-
nously assign the role of communicatorto one group member in a nitely repeated
voluntary contribution game. They nd that this one-way free-formcommunica-
tion has a large positive e¤ect on contributions. A growing experimental literature
studies leaders without pre-imposed salience or authority in nitely repeated interac-
tions (see e.g. Bruttel and Fischbacher, 2010; Gächter, Nosenzo, Renner and Sefton,
2012; Kocher, Pogrebna and Sutter, 2013; and Arbak and Villeval, 2013). Also fo-
cusing on social dilemmas, this literature has documented that emergent leaders are
motivated by e¢ ciency concerns, social image or generosity, and generally contribute
more than non-leaders. Our work complements this literature in that we explore
the endogenous emergence of leaders in indenitely repeated settings, and how this
phenomenon relates to social preferences. In addition, whereas we primarily study
leadership through communication, most of the other papers study leadership inu-
ence through actions and authority.
Finally, our work also contributes to the literature on communication in games
with multiple equilibria (e.g. Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross, 1992; Ledyard,
1995; Seely, Van Huyck and Battalio, 2007); while the extant literature is concerned
about the e¤ect of communication on the frequency of Pareto-optimal outcomes,
we instead explore how a groups social preference composition leads to patterns of
communication (e.g., leadership emergence) that result in players coordinating on
their Pareto-optimal outcome.
3 Experimental Design
In total, we conducted 7 experimental sessions with 147 subjects. Participants were
students from UC Berkeley, enrolled in the X-lab subject pool. Sessions lasted ap-
proximately 60 minutes from reading instructions to subject payment, which averaged
approximately $16 per subject. Participants were not allowed to take part in more
than one session. The treatments were programmed and conducted using z-Tree de-
veloped by Fischbacher (2007).
We had the dual purpose of identifying subjectssocial preferences and measuring
their choices when facing a relative performance incentive scheme. In order to achieve
this, the experiment was divided into three stages. In the beginning of the rst
stage, we randomly matched subjects into anonymous groups of three individuals
and they remained in the same group for the remainder of this stage. Participants
were then given 100 tokens for each of 9 periods and played a dictator game with their
group members (including themselves). In each period, participants faced di¤erent
3See, for example, Meidinger and Villeval (2002), Gächter and Renner (2005), Güth, Levati,
Sutter, and Van Der Heijden (2007), and Moxnes and Van der Heijden (2003).
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pricesor token exchange rates of giving to each group member. Prices varied such
that we could both identify individualswillingness to give to others and individuals
willingness to give between others when facing di¤erent prices of giving.4 We use these
9 periods to classify our subjects in terms of social preferences. In periods 10 and 11
we conducted allocation decisions with upwards-sloping budget sets as in Andreoni
and Miller (2002) where subjects are given an allocation and decide on the overall
exchange rate. In contrast to the previous dictator menus, here there is no possibility
to distribute value between oneself and the other group members. The only choice a
subject has is on the overall value of the endowment, not on how it is split up. We will
use these decisions to test whether aversion to disadvantageous inequality matters in
addition to other-regardingness in responding to relative incentives. These results
are reported in the Appendix. Finally, since we follow the categorization of Andreoni
and Miller (2002), we are thus exploring unconditional rather than conditional social
preferences.
Subjects did not learn their other group memberschoices to avoid uncontrolled
learning. Participants were told that for 5 out of a total of 11 allocation decisions
one of the group memberschoices would be randomly selected to compute payo¤s.
We use this rst stage, in particular decisions in rounds 1 to 9, to classify partic-
ipants as Selshor Other-Regarding,consistent with our intended meaning used
in section (4) : An archetypal Selsh type, is only interested in his own monetary
payo¤ and thus should never allocate any tokens to his or her group members. Thus
we classify as Selsh all subjects that throughout rounds 1-9 do not allocate any
tokens to another group member. The remainder of subjects are classied as Other-
Regarding. We consider various other possible classications in the analysis found
in our online appendix; however, they provide little additional insight to this simple
classication.
For the second stage, participants were again randomly matched with two other
players for the remainder of the experiment. The purpose of this stage was to give
players the possibility to collude by jointly providing low levels of e¤ort. Thus, we
implemented an indenitely repeated game with continuation probability of  = 95%:
In order to gain consistency across treatments, we randomly drew the number of
periods before running the sessions as in Fudenberg, Rand, and Dreber (2012). In
particular, our random draw resulted in 29 periods of relative-performance-pay play,
which was then xed for all subjects, in all treatments.
A subjects per period payo¤ during this stage was calculated as follows:
i = 12 +
xi
x
15  xi
4Fisman et al. (2007) uses a slightly di¤erent nomenclature to describe distributional preferences.
They call preferences for giving the fundamentals that rule the trade-o¤ between individual and
otherspayo¤s and social preferences the ones that govern the allocation between others. Our study
does not focus on that distinction, therefore we employ the following terminology: We use social
preferencesor other regarding concernsinterchangeably to represent non-selsh behavior.
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where x = xj
3
is the average e¤ort across i0s group and i chooses e¤ort xi 2 [1; 12]:5
Hence, each participants e¤ort is discounted by the average e¤ort, so a higher average
e¤ort will reduce payo¤s, ceteris paribus. This is the relative performance evaluation
similar to the contract used by Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2005).6 Note these
gures are in Berkeley Bucks $, converted at $66.6 Berkeley Bucks to 1 US$, which
is how it was presented to subjects.7 Each participant received an endowment of $12
(Berkeley Bucks $) each period from which they could choose costly e¤ort. E¤ort
costs $1 for each unit of e¤ort. Subjects were paid the sum of their earnings over all
periods for this stage.
The one-shot Nash equilibrium for homogeneous and Selsh players is to play xi =
10 for all i; which is below 12 (the upper bound of the action space). Coordinating
on xi = 1 under grim-trigger strategies is sustained by a continuation probability
 > 60% (optimal one-shot deviation from Pareto Dominant outcome is to play
xi ' 7:5). Therefore, our  = 95% should guarantee the feasibility of coordinating on
low e¤orts for utility maximizing rational Selsh agents.
After the allocation decisions, for the nal stage, subjects completed a risk aversion
test as in Holt and Laury (2002), and a basic demographic questionnaire.
We also varied factors considered important for creating and sustaining low levels
of e¤ort. In particular, in the rst treatment (Chat) we allowed chat via computer
terminals during each period and observability of choices and payo¤s after every
period. We recorded the chat messages in order to identify coordination leaders and
their social preferences. In the second treatment (No Chat) we did not allow for
chat but continued with observability after each period.
If we were able to mechanically switch on and o¤ subjects social preferences, we
could directly identify the e¤ect of social preferences on e¤ort. Unfortunately, this is
not generally possible. However, we conducted a nal treatment where we approx-
imate this idea. Instead of facing human subjects, a subject played against their
computer, which simulated the play of past subjectsdecisions (Robottreatment).
This treatment attempted to switch o¤ social preferences by making it clear to
subjects that even though they faced the same consequences for their choices as if
playing human subjects, their e¤ort decisions no longer a¤ected any persons payo¤s.
Table 1 provides a summary of these treatments.
5Although subjects were not told to do so, almost all entered e¤ort choices as an integer. We
had an e¤ort lower bound of 1 to create an upper bound for payo¤s. The e¤ort upper bound of 12
came from the periodic endowment of $12:
6Note that this is mathematically the same as a Tullock contest played by risk-neutral individuals.
That is, the principal has a total pool of 45 Berkeley Bucks to distribute across workers based on
their relative performance.
7A copy of the instructions given to subjects is available in the appendix.
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Treatment Subjects
Chat 63
No Chat 63
Robot 21
Total 147
Table 1: Summary of treatments
4 Hypotheses
Before turning to our results, we develop several hypotheses to guide our ensuing
analysis. To ease exposition, we use the label Selsh to mean those individuals that
only value their own payo¤. In addition, we use the label Other-Regarding to denote
those individuals that value both their own payo¤ and some fraction of their parters
payo¤s.8
In indenitely repeated games such as ours, achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes
is a well-known theoretical possibility provided xed-partners and  large enough.
However, absent communication, it proves di¢ cult to obtain coordination on the
Pareto-dominant outcome experimentally (see e.g. Fonseca, and Normann 2012).
This suggests that, in such a setting, subjects will revert to playing noncooperative
strategies. Since Other-regarding subjects internalize their negative externality of
their e¤ort-level in a relative-pay setting, we expect them to choose less e¤ort than
Selsh subjects. This logic leads to our rst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Absent communication, Other-Regarding subjects exert lower ef-
forts than Selsh subjects.
For the balance of the paper we use the label leader to mean someone who at-
tempts to coordinate others on the Pareto-dominant outcome (i.e., all coordinate on
minimal e¤ort). We conceptualize the incentive to become a coordinating leader as
the di¤erence between ones payo¤ from a non-coordinating and coordinating equilib-
rium. Assume, that a subject believes others will behave (on average) as she does (see
Mullen et al. 1985, and Engelmann and Strobel, 2000). In our setting, this means
that subjects expect others to play as if they were of the same type (i.e., either Selsh
or Other-Regarding). Next, consider the Nash stage-game as the non-coordinating
equilibrium and the Pareto-dominant equilibrium as the coordinating equilibrium. In
this case, it can be shown that, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium outcome yields both
Selsh and Other-Regarding players the same expected utility.9 However, in the Nash
8From now on we use the capitalized form of selsh and other-regarding to refer to our catego-
rization. Thus we do not imply that a subject we categorize as selsh necessarily always acts in a
selsh manner, but only that given our categorization, he or she most closely resembles this type.
9In this equilibrium, all players receive the same payo¤. Thus, regardless of how much weight
one places on his own versus the other playerspayo¤s, he receives the same overall utility. We
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stage-game equilibrium, Selsh players have a lower expected utility compared with
Other-Regarding players, since the latter produce lower e¤orts, which increases the
overall expected payo¤s. Hence, Selsh players have more to gain by coordinating on
the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. This yields our next hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Selsh subjects are more likely to emerge as leaders
Since a leader is most likely needed for achieving the Pareto-dominant outcome
(e.g., see Kreps 1986, and Hermalin 2012), and we expect Selsh people are more likely
to become a leader (Hypothesis 2), a group with no Selsh subjects is less likely to
collude (i.e., coordinate on minimal e¤ort) than a group with a Selsh player:
Hypothesis 3. With communication, collusion is more likely for a group with a
Selsh player than one with no Selsh players.
Ideally, we would like to turn o¤and turn on social preferences to identify
their e¤ects on e¤orts. We can possibly achieve this by pairing individuals with
subjects that behave like human subjects but do not incur payo¤s. Specically,
other-regarding concerns should not play a role when partners are machines. Thus, if
we pair subjects knowingly with computer-simulated subjects, we expect Selsh and
Other-Regarding subjects to behave similarly.
Hypothesis 4. Selsh and Other-Regarding subjects behave similarly when paired
with computer simulated subject.
5 Experimental Results
We begin by classifying subjects in terms of social preferences derived from their
giving behavior. We then use these results to study the relationship of individual and
the group composition of social preferences and e¤ort, the emergence of leaders, and
collusive outcomes.
5.1 Categorizing Social Preference Types fromGivingMenus
Table 2 summarizes the mean choices of our subjects under all 9 price vectors in
treatments: 1) Chat and 2) No Chat.10 We analyze the Robot treatment in section
5.4.
We see that regardless of the price of giving, subjects keep on average just above
70% of their endowment. Using these choices, we sort our subjects into Selsh and
Other-Regarding. A subject is categorized as Selsh if he or she does not allocate
any tokens to the other group members in any of the nine periods. All subjects who
work under the simplifying assumption that Other-regarding playersutility is a weighted sum of
individual payo¤s and weights add up to one.
10These vectors (a; b; c) represent the price a of giving to ones self, the price b of giving to player
1, and the price c of giving to player 2.
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Period Price vector Keep (min;max) Give to 1 Give to 2
1. (1; 1; 1) 69.64 (33,100) 15.61 14.75
2.
 
1; 12 ;
1
2

73.93 (20,100) 13.14 12.93
3.
 
1; 34 ;
3
4

72.27 (0,100) 13.71 14.02
4.
 
1; 54 ;
5
4

71.88 (20,100) 14.24 13.88
5.
 
1; 32 ;
3
2

70.28 (20,100) 14.98 14.75
6.
 
1; 1; 23

72.31 (30,100) 16.44 11.25
7.
 
1; 1; 34

73.51 (25,100) 15.35 11.14
8.
 
1; 34 ;
1
2

77.48 (25,100) 12.56 9.95
9.
 
1; 54 ;
3
4

72.32 (25,100) 16.65 11.03
Table 2: Giving rates.
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Figure 1: Allocation of Selsh across groups.
at some point allocated tokens to their group members are categorized as Other-
Regarding. We explore other categorizations of social preferences in the Appendix.
Taking together the two treatments (Chat and No Chat) most of the participants
(80.95%) are categorized as Other-Regarding. The remaining subjects (19.05% ) are
categorized as Selsh.11
As described in Section 3 subjects were randomly allocated into groups without
regard to their social preference type. Figure 1 shows the distribution of Selsh
subjects across groups. Since subjects were allocated randomly and Selsh subjects
are relatively rare we do not observe groups with only Selsh group members in the
Chat and No Chat treatments. Otherwise, we do observe random variations across
groups in the number of Selsh subjects which we will use to identify the e¤ect of
group composition in the next sections.
11Andreoni and Miller (2002), found 23% of their subjects can be classifed as perfectly selsh and
Fisman et al. (2007) found that was the case for 26% of their sample.
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5.2 Social Preferences and E¤ort
Figure 2 provides a summary of e¤ort choices over time by treatment. In both
treatments we observe average e¤ort of around 8 units at the beginning of the relative
incentives stage. As expected, there is a strong tendency to coordinate on lower e¤orts
over time when subjects are able to communicate in the Chat treatment (dashed line).
When communication was absent (No Chat treatment), average e¤ort stays close to
the one-shot Nash equilibrium prediction (i.e., 10) for the Selsh type (dotted line).
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Figure 2: Average e¤ort by treatment over time.
How do individual social preferences and group composition relate to e¤orts? To
nd an answer to this question we exploit the random allocation of subjects into
groups. We compare behavior of groups with di¤erent numbers of Selsh and Other-
Regarding individuals in each of the two treatments.
Figure 3 gives a rst overview of our ndings. Consider rst panel a). We compare
the average e¤ort of subjects categorized as Selsh with the average e¤ort of subjects
categorized as Other-Regarding. We see that for both treatments, average e¤ort is
higher for subjects categorized as Selsh, although a t-test rejects equality only for the
No Chat treatment (p-values: p<0.60 in Chat and p<0.01 in No Chat).12 In the No
Chat treatment, average e¤orts are similar to the one-shot Nash equilibrium e¤orts
(i.e., e¤orts of 10 with  = 0) rather than to a collusive outcome and Other-Regarding
subjects provide lower e¤orts on average.
In panel b) we consider average group e¤ort as a function of the number of Selsh
players within a group. When communication was not possible, we observe that
each additional Selsh group member modestly increases average group e¤ort though
12This is consistent with Erkal, Gangadharan and Nikiforakis (2011) in that selsh individuals
tend to exert higher levels of e¤ort in tournaments.
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Figure 3: Overview of e¤ects of social preferences on e¤ort.
none of these increases reach statistical signicance. When communication is possible,
there is a pronounced increase in average e¤ort when comparing a group with two
Selsh group members versus those with fewer Selsh members; however, likely due
to only one group with two Selsh members in the data, the di¤erence does not reach
statistical signicance. Meanwhile, groups with only one Selsh member generate the
lowest average e¤ort.
We further explore di¤erences in group e¤ort choices as a function of the number
of Selsh subjects controlling for a number of group characteristics through regression
analysis in Table 3. We use as the dependent variable the group e¤ort averaged over
all rounds of play (at stage 2, our relative performance stage) in columns 1 and
2, and averaged over the nal periods, periods 30-40 in columns 3 and 4. In the
Chat treatment, we do not nd a signicant e¤ect of Selsh group members. This is
likely the result of greater e¤ort from a group with two Selsh members cancelling
out the reduced e¤ort of the groups with only one Selsh member. In contrast,
when communication is not possible (No Chat treatment), each Selsh group member
increases average group e¤ort by approximately .9 units over all periods on average,
which equals a 9% increase over our baseline mean e¤ort of roughly 9.7 per period.
Overall, these results suggest that, absent communication, average e¤orts are
consistent with one-shot Nash equilibrium strategies. When communication is intro-
duced, however, e¤orts seem to follow the collusive outcome and results are somewhat
surprising: The presence of one Selsh individual leads to lowest aggregate e¤orts.
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All Periods Periods 30-40
Chat No Chat Chat No Chat
# Selsh 1.063 0.872 1.791 1.196
(1.626) (0.379) (1.610) (0.687)
Constant 3.180 9.453 1.769 8.656
(1.022) (0.440) (0.925) (0.793)
Observations 21 21 21 21
Adjusted R2 -0.012 0.081 0.051 0.029
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 3: E¤ect of groupssocial preference composition on group e¤ort.
This is due to Selsh individuals being more likely to lead by suggesting coordination
on low e¤orts, as we nd in Section (5:3). Before turning there, we explore further
the e¤ect of group composition on e¤orts in the No Chat treatment.
5.2.1 No-Chat Treatment
To disentangle the e¤ect of an individuals social preferences from group composition
e¤ects, we estimate a random e¤ects model for the No Chat treatment, clustering
standard errors at the group level.13 The dependent variable is individual e¤ort and
the explanatory variables are: Selsh and the number of other Selsh individuals in
each group (# Other Selsh). We control for# Other Selsh since, as given in Section
(4) ; we expect Selsh and Other-Regarding players to inuence e¤orts di¤erently,
both through their own e¤orts and through possible leadership by example. This
means that we are exploring the e¤ect of individual social preferences conditional on
how many other Selsh players are in ones group.
Table 4 reports our results. We nd further evidence that Other-Regarding sub-
jects choose signicantly less e¤ort. Controlling for group composition, these subjects
choose 1.5 fewer units of e¤ort over all periods. The group composition e¤ect on
the other hand, is positive but insignicant. Thus, absent communication, Other-
Regarding subjects depress e¤orts relative to Selsh subjects, but only through the
channel of individual social preferences. This provides our rst primary result, which
is consistent with our rst hypothesis:
Result 1: Absent communication, Other-Regarding subjects depress e¤orts rela-
tive to Selsh subjects.
13Throughout the paper when using a random e¤ects regression we cluster at the group level.
Results are qualitatively unchanged when clustering at the individual level.
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All Periods Periods 30-40
Period -0.0538 (0.0294) -0.0303 (0.0448)
Selsh 1.478 (0.401) 1.871 (0.765)
# Other Selsh 0.569 (0.412) 0.858 (0.678)
Constant 10.85 (0.502) 9.717 (1.805)
Observations 1827 693
R2 within/between 0.0322/0.0954 0.0025/0.0628
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 4: E¤ect of own and others social preferences on own e¤ort (No Chat).
5.3 Chat and Leadership
In the Chat treatment, a subject can take the initiative through chat, asking the group
members to jointly exert low e¤ort. This coordinating leader can then overcome the
equilibrium selection problem. From the content of chat messages we label a Min-
E¤ort Leaderas a subject that is the rst to propose coordinating on the minimum
e¤ort case (i.e., for all group members to provide e¤ort of 1).14 We identify 13 Min-
E¤ort Leaders (21%) among the 63 subjects (21 groups) in the Chat treatment.15
Figure 4 reports the distribution of social preference types in the sample of Min-
E¤ort Leaders and Non-Min-E¤ort Leaders. We observe that Selsh individuals are
more likely to be leaders. A Pearson chisquared test shows this di¤erence is signi-
cant at the 5% level (p=0.03).
Do social preferences a¤ect outcomes in the Chat treatment beyond the likelihood
of a Selsh subject emerging as a coordinating leader? Table 5 reports the results
of a random e¤ects model exploring individual e¤ort choices. Column 1 shows a
regression without considering leader emergence, analogous to the results reported
in Table 4 for the No Chat treatment. In column 2 we add a control for whether
a Min-E¤ort Leader has emerged and whether the subject herself is a Min-E¤ort
Leader. Notice that the coe¢ cients of own social preference as well as group members
social preferences are highly signicant and larger in magnitude once controlling for
14We initially collected two other categories of leadership. A Failed Leaderto denote a subject
that called on his group members to decrease e¤orts but was not listened to/followed. This is a rare
event in our study and thus we do not include this variable in our analysis. We also considered a
First Leader,which was the rst subject to propose coordination of e¤orts. However, this latter
category has little explanatory power and so we omit it from our analysis.
15We also had both a research assistant from Erasmus University Rotterdam and from North-
western University independently code the leadership variables. The instructions given to the RAs
are provided in the appendix. The correlations between the alternative leadership dummies and
the ones we use in the paper are for Northwestern: 0.88 for whether a Min-E¤ort Leader exists (on
a period/group level) and 0.82 for the subject being a Min-E¤ort Leader (subject level); and for
Rotterdam 0.52 for whether a Min-E¤ort Leader exists and 0.56 for the subject being a Min-E¤ort
Leader. For both of these classications, we nd similar results in our following analysis.
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Figure 4: Social preferences of leaders.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Periods Per. 30-40
Period -0.133 -0.0725 -0.0728 -0.0567
(0.0276) (0.0250) (0.0245) (0.0234)
Selsh 1.069 2.054 2.797 3.857
(1.596) (0.737) (0.687) (0.612)
# Other Selsh 1.060 2.067 2.864 3.846
(1.581) (0.694) (0.600) (0.734)
Min-E¤ort Leader Exists -5.709 -3.661 -2.713
(0.637) (0.423) (0.422)
Min-E¤ort Leader 0.0784 0.107 0.0109
(0.350) (0.338) (0.0589)
MELeader*Selsh -2.729 -3.555
(0.678) (0.645)
MELeader*#OthSelf -2.800 -3.539
(0.562) (0.779)
Constant 6.628 7.353 6.911 5.589
(1.471) (0.741) (0.789) (1.032)
Observations 1827 1827 1827 693
R2 within/between 0.10/0.03 0.21/0.74 0.21/0.78 0.03/0.81
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 5: E¤ect of social preferences on individual e¤ort controling for leadership
(Chat treatment).
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leadership in this way. This means that after controlling for the e¤ect of social
preferences inuencing leadership emergence, social preferences lead to signicantly
lower group e¤orts. The e¤ect is slightly larger in magnitude than in the No Chat
treatment. Precisely, a Selsh subject puts in 2 units e¤ort more per period than
an Other-Regarding subject, after controlling for the emergence of a coordination
leader. Furthermore, the presence of an additional Selsh group member increases a
subjects own e¤ort by 2 units per period also controlling for leader emergence.
Column 3 includes interactions of social preference measures and the emergence of
a leader. We nd that social preferences depress e¤orts when a Min-E¤ort Leader has
not emerged in a group. Other-regarding subjects depress their e¤ort relative to selsh
ones by about 30%. Once a leader emerges there is no di¤erence between Selsh and
Other-Regarding choices. Selsh are thus no more likely to deviate from a collusive
outcome. Finally, note that the coe¢ cient of Min-E¤ort Leader is insignicant. Thus,
Min-E¤ort Leaders do not lead also by good example: i.e., they only lead through
suggesting low e¤ort by chat message and not through actually initiating lower e¤ort
themselves. Column 4 reports estimates from only the last 11 periods of play and
nds results similar to those reported in column 3.
We conclude that social preferences are an important determinant of group e¤ort
also in the Chat treatment, though in a more nuanced way. On the one hand, sub-
jects can use communication to coordinate the group on a collusive outcome. Such
a leadertends to be a Selsh individual, which is consistent with our second Hy-
pothesis from Section (4). This explains why the presence of one Selsh individual
reduces e¤orts in the Chat treatment. On the other hand, controlling for the relation
of leadership and social preferences, Other-Regarding subjects have a tendency to put
in lower e¤ort than their Selsh counterparts, exactly as in the non-communication
treatments, suggesting these individuals internalize the externality their e¤ort inicts
on their group members before a coordination leader emerges. From a principals
perspective our results suggest that in a work environment where communication
is possible a heterogeneous social-preference group leads to the lowest work e¤ort:
adding a Selsh subject to an otherwise Other-Regarding group of workers can more
likely provide a leader to coordinate on low e¤orts.16 Finally, once a coordination
leader emerges and is successful, both Selsh and Other-Regarding workers are pro-
viding the same minimal e¤ort, which means that there is no longer a di¤erence
between their e¤orts as a function of their being Selsh or not. Thus, our analysis
yields two more results:
Result 2a: Selsh subjects are more likely to lead others to coordinate on low
e¤orts.
Result 2b: Without the emergence of a coordination leader, Other-Regarding
subjects depress e¤orts relative to Selsh subjects. When a leader emerges, there are
16We note that we do not observe the other possible homogenous group of only Selsh members.
Thus our comparison for homogeneous is for those groups only containing Other-regarding members.
We suspect that in practice this unobserved group in our experiment is a rarely occurring group.
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no di¤erences in e¤ort choices between Other-Regarding and Selsh subjects.
We performed a number of robustness checks for our main results, Results 1, 2a
and 2b. First, our results are robust to clustering standard errors at the individual
level instead of the group level in our individual-level analysis.
Next, given the relatively infrequent occurrence of Selsh individuals in our sam-
ple, we explored two alternative social preference measures. Under the rst one a
subject was classied as Selsh when he or she kept, on average, more than 90%
of the endowment in dictator menus 1-9 (instead of 100%). Using this classica-
tion we observe groups with 0, 1, 2 and 3 Selsh group members under both treat-
ments. Using this less stringent denition of Selsh we nd that the magnitude of
the coe¢ cient estimates on Selsh decreases, but stays signicant. However, for the
group level regression, the coe¢ cient estimate on # Selsh is no longer signicant.
Also, while we still observe Selsh becoming Min-E¤ort leaders at a higher rate than
Other-Regarding, this di¤erence becomes insignicant. Under the second measure
we conduct individual-level regressions using the average endowment keep in rounds
1-9 directly in our regressions. Our results under this measure are qualitatively un-
changed. Thus, Result 1 as well as 2a and 2b are also supported under these two
alternative approaches. In addition, since e¤ort choices are constrained to be be-
tween 1 and 12; we re-run our analysis using a Tobit panel model. We nd these
results are qualitatively the same. We also conducted our individual level analysis
controlling for gender, education major, and risk preferences, and nd the results
qualitatively unchanged. Furthermore, none of these additional controls show consis-
tent patterns throughout the analysis. Since the environment we study is dynamic
with xed matching, subjects can respond to past e¤ort choices of their group mem-
bers. Controlling for the social preferences of the group members can account for
some of this path dependence in our analysis, though it is clearly imperfect. Thus,
we nally conduct our analysis including lagged e¤ort choices of all group members.
Both own and others lagged e¤ort are signicant and important predictors of indi-
vidual e¤ort choices. Nonetheless, our previous social preference parameters are still
signicant, although attenuated since we are now controlling for past choices.
5.3.1 Propensity to Collude
Thus far we have been focussing on the relationship between social preferences and
depressed e¤orts. Depressed e¤orts can of course also be a consequence of collusion.
While we are naturally unable to observe our subjectsstrategies directly, we take an
indirect approach and measure the frequency of collusiveoutcomes consistent with
coordination on minimum e¤orts: That is, all three players coordinate on e¤orts of 1
(i.e., e¤orts of (1; 1; 1)). We additionally include as collusive outcomethe setting
where all three players coordinate on the outcome of two players choosing e¤ort of
1 while a third player chooses maximal (payo¤) e¤ort of 12; and then the players
alternate the player who gets the maximal payo¤. This latter form of coordinating
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Figure 5: Fraction of groups achieving (1; 1; 1) for 3 successive rounds of play (hollow
symbols) and (1; 1; 1) or alternating (1; 1; 12) for 3 successive rounds (solid symbols)
by number of Selsh group members for the Chat Treatment.
on low e¤orts is only witnessed in the Chat treatment where subjects were allowed
to coordinate via chat.17
Figure 5 depicts the dynamics of groups achieving the collusiveoutcome in the
Chat treatment. Here, we separate groups by the number of Selsh members (groups
with 0; 1; or 2 Selsh members). Similar to our results on e¤orts from Section 5.3,
when chat is available, groups with 1 Selsh member are more likely to exhibit collu-
sive outcomes than groups with no Selsh members. When we expand the denition
of collusionto include the case of the group cycling e¤orts of (1; 1; 12) across play-
ers, we again nd groups with 1 Selsh member are more successful at achieving the
collusive outcome than groups with no Selsh members. Note though that the frac-
tion of groups choosing the turn-taking strategy (1; 1; 12) is similar for groups with
one or no Selsh group member, which means that this outcome does not seem to be
related to social preferences.
Comparing the results in Figure 5 to Figure 3 leads to an interesting observation.
Even though groups with one Selsh member are more likely to collude, average
17Analyzing the chat messages reveals two reasons for the occurrence of this coordinated strategy.
Some groups were of the opinion that this was in fact the prot maximizing strategy to take. For
other groups taking turns on choosing maximal e¤ort was used to make things even after one
subject deviated from the collusive outcome of (1; 1; 1):
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e¤ort is quantitatively not very di¤erent from a group with no Selsh (3.2 vs. 4.1).
As already explained in Section 5.3 the reason for this is that in the pre-collusion
phase groups with no Selsh members put in lower e¤orts than groups with one
Selsh member (average e¤ort is 5.4 in a group of only Other-Regarding vs. 7.5 in a
group with one Selsh prior to the emergence of a Min-E¤ort Leader). This further
corroborates our result that social preferences seem to matter in complex ways when
communication is possible: Selsh individuals play an important role in facilitating
coordination on the collusive outcome (Hypotheses 2 and 3) while Other-Regarding
have a tendency to put in lower e¤orts even absent collusive motives (Hypothesis 1).
Thus, we summarize our nal primary result, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3:
Result 3: With communication, the propensity to collude is greater with one
Selsh group member than with no Selsh group members
For the No Chat treatment, coordinating on a collusive outcome was more
di¢ cult, since subjects were not able to chat. As shown in Table 6, we nd for this
setting that only 1 out of 21 groups end up with minimum e¤orts in the last 3 periods
and only if the group has no Selsh members. One other group with no Selsh group
members managed to sustain (1; 1; 1) for 3 periods during the course of the game,
but then reverted back to higher e¤ort. If we expand the denition of collusive
outcome to include two subjective cases of collusion(we report their behavior in
the appendix), then we nd one additional group with no Selsh members and one
additional group with 1 Selsh member successfully colludeby the end of the game.
It seems that collusion is not a main driver of behavior in this treatment and results
seem more consistent with the predictions of the one-shot game.
# Selsh Propensity to collude Propensity to collude
group members on (1; 1; 1) (self-classication)
0 (14 groups) 7% 14%
1 (5 groups) 0% 20%
2 (2 group) 0% 0%
Table 6: Propensity to colludeby # of Selsh in the No Chat treatment.
5.4 Robot Treatment
This treatment is similar to the No Chat treatment in the sense that subjects cannot
communicate but are permitted to observe the e¤orts and payo¤s of their group
members after each period. The crucial di¤erence is that in stage 2, instead of
randomly pairing subjects to each other, we paired them to two simulated subjects
we call robots.18 In particular, we programmed 42 robot subjects who react to
18We provide additional description of this treatment, as well as analysis on the e¢ cacy of the
robots in our appendix.
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past e¤ort decisions by approximating what human subjects did in the No Chat
treatment. Specically, each robot chooses current period e¤ort based on last
periods own e¤ort and e¤ort choices of the other two subjects in the same way the
human subject did in previous No Chat treatments. Crucial to this treatment is that
subjects e¤ort choices no longer impose a negative externality on other players, since
the robots receive no payo¤s. Thus, the fundamental di¤erence between the No Chat
and the Robot treatment is that the latter attempts to turn o¤ subjects social
preferences since their actions no longer a¤ect any other human. Note, however, that
social preferences are not completely absent: the robots choices simulate decisions by
participants whose social preferences did matter. Thus, subjectsdecisions can reect
beliefs about the past subjectssocial preferences. This is, in fact, helpful for us, as
it allows us to distinguish an alternative hypothesis: Selshsubjects di¤er in their
beliefs about their group members (re-)actions from Other-Regarding subjects.
If this were the case, we should still see a di¤erence between Selsh and Other-
Regarding e¤ort choices in this treatment. Di¤erences in e¤ort should vanish in this
treatment, however, if beliefs about other playerssocial preferences do not play a role
in depressing own e¤ort choices. Furthermore, other potential confounds such as skill
di¤erences or di¤erences in patience between Selsh and Other-Regarding are
also not turned o¤by this treatment, allowing us further to test the appropriateness
of our initial categorization.
We rst compare subject behavior for the No Chat treatment and the Robot
treatment graphically. Figure 6 depicts the e¤ort proles over the 29 periods of play
by treatment for Selsh and Other-Regarding individuals. We nd that in the rst
half of the relative performance stage (16 periods from periods 12 to 27) the e¤ort
of Selsh and Other-Regarding subjects in the Robot treatment is not statistically
di¤erent (t-test, p-value 0.21), supporting the validity of our categorization. There is
some e¤ort divergence in the intermediate term though, and then by the end of the
relative performance stage, e¤orts of di¤erent social types converge back to similar
e¤ort levels. In fact, in the last 5 rounds a t-test cannot reject equality of e¤orts (p-
value 0.16). Interestingly, e¤orts of all social preference types in the Robot treatment
converge towards the e¤orts of Selsh subjects in the No Chat treatment.
Thus, while predictions from Hypothesis 4, are borne out in the rst half, we nd
only partial evidence of equal behavior between Selsh and Other-Regarding players
for the entire last half of the relative performance game in the Robot treatment.
Perhaps, subjects forgot that they were playing robot subjects and began behaving
as if they were playing human subjects. We did attempt to minimize this possibility by
reminding subjects on each e¤ort-entry screen that their e¤ort choice will not a¤ect
the payo¤s of any participants. Unfortunately, we cannot rule out that subjects
disregarded this message after 15 periods. It nonetheless does seem these results
suggest that beliefs are not driving the di¤erence in choices for di¤erent types of
players: beliefs should loom largest in creating di¤erences at the beginning of the
relative-performance game before they converge based on experience. However, we
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Figure 6: Comparing e¤orts between Selsh and Other-Regarding types over time.
observe just the opposite pattern. In short, we nd weak evidence for Hypothesis 4.
If we instead analyze individual rather than average aggregate e¤ort choices, which
may mask individual behavior, we nd the same pattern of similar e¤ort choices
across social preference types. Table 7 reports the results of regressing individual
e¤ort on individuals and group memberssocial preference types for the No Chat
and the Robot treatment for all periods and periods 30-40. The coe¢ cient estimate
for Selsh is smaller in magnitude than in the No Chat treatment and is no longer
signicant, though we do note the sample size is smaller in the Robot treatment.
Result 4: When a subjects action a¤ects a machines success rather than a
humans success, Selsh and Other-Regarding subjects seem to behave similarly
These suggestive results from the Robot treatment provide evidence at least con-
sistent with the idea that social preferences matter in creating and sustaining non-
competitive e¤orts.
6 Conclusion
We studied how an important dimension of worker heterogeneity a¤ects the perfor-
mance of those subject to relative performance incentives. In particular, we found
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All Periods Periods 30-40
No Chat Robot No Chat Robot
Period -0.0538 0.0168 -0.0303 0.109
(0.0294) (0.0285) (0.0448) (0.0578)
Selsh 1.478 0.824 1.871 1.260
(0.401) (0.813) (0.765) (0.981)
# Other Selsh 0.569 -0.280 0.858 0.0303
(0.412) (0.996) (0.678) (1.081)
Constant 10.85 9.152 9.717 5.732
(0.502) (0.685) (1.805) (2.411)
Observations 1827 609 693 231
R2 within/between 0.032/0.095 0.003/0.049 0.0025/0.0628 0.0353 /0.0616
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 7: E¤ect of social preferences on individual e¤ort No Chat vs. Robot treatment.
that a basic form of social preferences, the degree of other-regardingness, is sub-
stantially linked to reduced e¤ort choices, but in a complex way. First, subjects
categorized as Selsh are more likely to coordinate their group members to exercise
minimal e¤orts, when communication is available. Second, before the emergence of
such leaders, subjects categorized as other-regarding exert lower levels of e¤ort an
average of over 30% lower e¤ort. Thus, when communication is available, a group that
is heterogenous in social preferences can most successfully create and sustain very low
e¤orts over those groups with no Selsh members. Finally, when communication is
not available, groups of Other-Regarding subjects produce the lowest levels of e¤ort.
Since we nd little evidence of collusive outcomes, this is again consistent with the
idea that Other-Regarding individuals internalize their e¤ortsnegative externality
imposed on other peoples payo¤s.
To further validate our ndings, we also attempted to switch o¤subjectsso-
cial preferences through our Robot treatment. For this experiment, we simulated
the responses of human subjects via machine, thus removing a players negative ex-
ternality. By the end of the treatment, Other-Regarding subjects seemed to act like
Selsh subjects, suggesting that Other-Regarding people internalize their e¤ort choice
externality when it is imposed on others through relative performance incentives.
Our ndings suggest that for organizations attracting more other-regarding work-
ers (e.g., rms engaged in corporate social responsibility or non-prot rms), relative
performance incentives are unlikely to be as e¤ective as they are for other organiza-
tions. For rms using relative incentive pay, screening workers for particular positions
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according to their social preferences could improve performance. Human resource
departments often provide potential workers with psychological-based exams. These
could readily incorporate explicit measures of other-regardingness. Similarly, informa-
tion obtained from resumes, such as a potential workers involvement in philanthropic
activities, could shed light on a workers degree of other-regardingness.
We note that we did not consider the case where workers might value their rms
payo¤. Thus, our results can be seen as applying to settings where ownership is
dispersed or the worker is removed from the top of the hierarchy. Finally, our measure
of leadership is endogenous to the e¤ort exerted in each group. It is an interesting
challenge to design an experiment in which leadership varies with incentives and
analyze how it relates to social preferences.
Although our setting only allows for the possibility of valuing negative externali-
ties, to the extent that workers also value their positive externalities, other-regarding
preferences could mitigate the free rider problem amongst teams. That is, a team of
workers with Other-Regarding preferences that receive a share of the common output
are more likely to provide higher outputs, as they further value their e¤orts positive
e¤ects on their team members. We leave these topics for future research.
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Figure 7: Examples of group giving and investment decisions (S denotes session num-
ber and G group number).
7 Appendix
7.1 Examples of Decisions
We begin with some examples to illustrate subjectsbehavior. Figure 7 illustrates
the patterns of decisions across time. In the rst stage (periods 1 to 9), we observe
the number of tokens each player in the group keeps for him or herself (measured
on the left y-axis). In the second stage, (periods 12 to 40) we observe the choice of
e¤ort ranging from 1 to 12 (measured on the right y-axis).19 Each of the three group
members is represented by a di¤erent symbol a circle, a triangle and a cross.
Starting with Panel 1 we observe a heterogeneous pattern of keeping in the rst
stage: One subject keeps everything to himself, while the others share almost equally.
Thus, this group consists of one Selsh and two Other-Regarding subjects. Further-
more, it provides an example of a perfectcollusive outcome in the Chat treatment:
19We omitted periods 10 and 11 from the graphs. They are used for an extended categorization
of subjects in the Appendix.
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Subjects coordinate on minimal e¤ort during almost the entire second stage (i.e., the
e¤ort choice stage).
Coordination on minimum e¤ort (1; 1; 1) also occurs absent communication.
Panel 2 provides an example in the No Chat treatment on how subjects slowly manage
to coordinate on lower e¤orts.
Panel 3 shows a group from the Chat treatment. In this case, behavior in the sec-
ond stage is surprising: Subjects alternate between providing maximal and minimal
e¤ort. In each period a di¤erent subject reaps the rents of outperforming the other
subjects. With the help of the chat, they perfectly coordinate on this synchronized
play. Although this does not allow the subjects to reach the maximal group payo¤,
this form of coordinating still leads to high payo¤s relative to the one-shot Nash
outcome. About 20% of groups in the Chat treatment exhibit a pattern like this, at
least part of the time.
Finally, communication does not guarantee payo¤-maximizing coordination. Our
last example, Panel 4 provides a case in point. In this group from the Chat treatment,
subjects choose the maximal e¤orts in almost every round.
7.2 Broader Social Preference Classications
In this section we explore two alternative social preference categorizations. In partic-
ular we will use dictator menus 1-11 to classify subjects into di¤erent types depending
on their choices. First we follow Andreoni and Miller (2002) and use menus 1-9 to
broaden the category of Other-Regarding into subjects who tend to give more when
the price of giving increases (we call them Complements) and subjects which tend
to react by giving less (we call these individuals Substitutes). The idea is that the
former represents the motive of fairness, while the latter represents the motive of e¢ -
ciency. Thus, menus 1-9 measure whether a subject values fairness or e¢ ciency under
favorable inequality. In a second analysis, we use dictator menus 10-11 to see whether
subjects have an aversion to unfavorable inequality (i.e., unfavorable in terms of their
own payo¤ relative to others). In the following, we provide more detail on the these
categorization procedures, as well as some additional analysis using these expanded
categories.
Complements vs. Substitutes
We use decision menus 1 to 9 (see Table 2 for an overview) to classify partici-
pants as Selsh, Complement (Rawlsian) or Substitute (Utilitarian). To do
so, we rst compute the relative giving rates of an archetypal Selsh, Utilitarian and
Rawlsian individual according to the preferences in Table 8. We denote player is
monetary payo¤ as i and the total number of players n: Thus, an archetypal Self-
ish type is only interested in her own monetary payo¤. In contrast, an archetypal
Rawlsian player only values the minimal monetary payo¤ of all of her group mem-
bers payo¤s. Finally, an archetypical Substitute simply maximizes her groups total
monetary payo¤.
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Figure 8: Giving rates by social preference types.
To categorize subjects, we then measure the Euclidian distance from each of the
participantsdecisions to each of these archetypesdecisions. We compute such dis-
tance for each choice and then we compare the average distance across periods to each
archetypes decision. We classify subjects as the archetype whose decision is closest
to the subjects decision.20 For treatments 1 and 2 we nd that, for our subject pop-
ulation, 19% are Selsh, 65% are Complements and 16% are Substitutes. Consistent
with Andreoni and Miller (2002), hereafter AM, we nd that 19% of subjects are
(perfectly) Selsh, whereas AM nd that 23% of subjects are perfectly Selsh. 7.1%
of our subject are classied as perfect Substitutes, while AM nd 6.2%. In contrast to
AM we only classify one subject as a perfect Complement, while they nd 14.2% are
perfect Complements. Di¤erent from AM, we do not have any weakSelsh types,
as we categorize all Other-Regarding subjects (i.e., subjects that give to others) as
either Complement or Substitute types.
Figure 8 illustrates giving behavior under our broader categorization of social
20Since we only use relative giving rates between the other two group members, our classication
does not account for the intensity of social preferences. We can control for intensity separately by
including the overall giving rate of a subject.
Social Preference Types Utility
Selsh i
Complement (Rawlsian) min fi; jg
Substitute (Utilitarian) i + j 6=ij
Table 8: Overview of social preference types.
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preferences types. We see that Selsh types, by denition, never give anything to
their group members. In contrast, Other-Regarding types give positive amounts,
on average, for every price vector. When the price of giving increases, Substitutes
typically react by decreasing their giving rate, while Complements do the opposite.
This is most easily seen for periods 6 to 9 where the price of giving to individual 2 is
always lower than the price of giving to individual 1 as can be seen in Table 2 . Thus,
as archetypal types would do, Complements react by allocating more to individual 1
while Substitutes react by allocating more to individual 2.
Table 9 is analogous to Table 3 and shows the results of a regression of aver-
age group e¤ort on the number of Complements and Substitutes in a group. Both
Complement and Substitute group members reduce group e¤ort relative to Selsh
group members in the No Chat treatment by approximately .8 units. In the Chat
treatment, a linear regression again does not yield signicant results; this is to be
expected given the discussion in the main text of the confound of leadership. We will
again consider the e¤ect of social preferences on leadership and explore whether it
di¤ers by Complements and Substitutes.
Table 10 is analogous to Table 4. Here, we present the results of a random
e¤ect panel regression model for the No Chat treatment that considers the e¤ect
of own and otherssocial preference type on individual e¤ort. The results from our
main analysis suggesting that Other-Regarding members exhibit lower e¤orts relative
to more Selsh group members holds also when we consider our subcategories of
Other-Regarding: Complements and Substitutes. Complements as well as Substitutes
exhibit lower e¤ort than their Selsh counterparts. In fact, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that Complements and Substitutes depress e¤ort by the same magnitude
(p-value 0:7102). Furthermore, we see that most of the e¤ort reduction is driven by
their own preference type (i.e., around 1.5 units) while the coe¢ cients on the other
group members social preference types are of the same sign, but much smaller in
magnitude and insignicant.
Finally, we turn to disentangling the e¤ect of social preferences on leadership and
individual e¤ort provision in the Chat treatment. Figure 9 reports the distribution of
social preferences among Non-Min-E¤ort Leaders and Min-E¤ort Leaders as dened
in Section 5.3. As before, Selsh are signicantly more likely to become Min-E¤ort
Leaders (chi-squared test, p-value=0.034). The opposite is true for Complements (p-
value=0.031). Finally, for Substitutes we do not nd a signicant e¤ect on leadership
propensity (p-value=0.678).
In order to disentangle the e¤ect of social preferences on the propensity to initiate
coordination from the e¤ect on e¤ort choice, we run a random e¤ect panel regression
analogous to Table 5 for the Chat treatment.
We report these results in Table 11. The rst column does not control for the
emergence of a Min-E¤ort Leader and whether or not an individual turns out to be a
Min-E¤ort Leader. The coe¢ cients on the social preferences are insignicant, though
they do indicate an e¤ort reduction by Complements and Substitutes. Controlling
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Chat No Chat
Avg E¤ort (Grp/Sess) Avg E¤ort (Grp/Sess)
# Compl. -0.593 -0.873
(1.582) (0.389)
# Subst. -1.742 -0.856
(2.009) (0.685)
Constant 5.952 12.06
(4.017) (0.942)
Observations 21 21
Adjusted R2 -0.036 0.030
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 9: Group composition and average group e¤ort.
(1) (2)
E¤ort E¤ort
Period -0.0538 (0.0294) -0.0538 (0.0294)
Selsh 1.478 (0.401)
# Other Selsh 0.569 (0.412)
Complement -1.410 (0.386)
Substitute -1.714 (0.854)
# Other Substitutes -0.427 (0.669)
# Other Complements -0.604 (0.411)
Constant 10.85 (0.502) 13.46 (1.188)
Observations 1827 1827
R2 within/between 0.0322/0.0954 0.0322/0.0994
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 10: E¤ect of own and others social preferences on own e¤ort (No Chat).
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Figure 9: The distribution of social preferences among Min-E¤ort Leaders and non-
Min-E¤ort Leaders.
for the emergence of a Min-E¤ort Leader and controlling for being a Min-E¤ort
Leader increases the magnitude of both coe¢ cients by approximately 1 unit, both
statistically signicant at the 1% level. Also, the social preference types of the other
group members matter. Having Complement or Substitute group members decreases
own e¤ort by about 2 units as well. Overall we conclude that there is a di¤erence
in the propensity to initiate coordination by Substitutes and Complements; however,
e¤ort choice is relatively similar.
Unfavorable Inequality
In a second classication, we use dictator menus 10-11 to di¤erentiate subjects by
their propensity to reduce their own payo¤ in order to reduce unfavorable inequality.
Subjects were given an allocation vector and were able to choose an exchange rate
between zero and two which translated tokens into payo¤s for all group members.
Thus, an exchange rate of 2 maximizes aggregate output, while an exchange rate of
zero minimizes inequality. Table 12 summarizes the two menus and the decisions of
subjects in Treatments 1 and 2. Overall, many subjects were willing to reduce their
own payo¤ at least once to reduce inequality. Furthermore, the fraction of subjects
who destroy some of their payo¤ goes up and the average exchange rate goes down
when the allocation becomes more unfavorable. For our analysis, we denote a subject
as Jealous when he or she chose an exchange rate of less than two in any of the two
menus. In treatments 1 and 2, 67% of subjects are classied as Jealous.
Using the category of Selsh/Other-Regarding as well as Jealous/Non-Jealous we
construct 4 new social preference categories:21
 Disinterested: not Jealous and Selsh (8%)
21Population proportions are for Treatments 1 and 2.
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(1) (2)
E¤ort E¤ort
Period -0.133 (0.0276) -0.0727 (0.0249)
Complement -0.458 (0.901) -1.884 (0.760)
Substitute -0.997 (1.301) -2.245 (0.891)
# Other Complements -1.880 (0.723)
# Other Substitutes -2.348 (0.847)
Min-E¤ort Leader Exists -5.690 (0.636)
Min-E¤ort Leader 0.0990 (0.353)
Constant 7.839 (1.265) 13.36 (1.844)
Observations 1827 1827
R2-within/between .100/.012 .212/.751
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 11: E¤ect of social preferences (extended categorization 1) on individual e¤ort
controling for leadership (Chat treatment).
Menu (Allocation) Mean Percent where rate=2
10 (20,40,40) 1.794 76%
11 (2,49,49) 1.259 54%
Table 12: Average exchange rate chosen in menu 10 and 11.
 Benevolent: not Jealous and Other-Regarding (25%)
 Spiteful: Jealous and Selsh (11%)
 Inequity Averse: Jealous and Other-Regarding (56%)
Table 13 reports the results of an OLS regression of average group e¤ort on the
number of Benevolent, Spiteful and Inequity Averse with Disinterested as the omitted
category analogous to Table 3. In the Chat treatment, we do not nd any signi-
cant e¤ect of these social preferences types. In the No Chat treatment we nd that
Spiteful group members are responsible for highest group e¤ort. On average, an addi-
tional Spiteful subject increases group e¤ort by 1.5 units. We do not nd signicant
di¤erences for all of other social preference types.
Finally, we explore whether this extended categorization yields new insights on
the propensity to initiate coordination when communication is possible. Figure 10
reports the distribution of social preferences for Non-Min-E¤ort Leaders (left panel)
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Chat No Chat
Avg E¤ort (Grp/Sess) Avg E¤ort (Grp/Sess)
# Spiteful -4.822 1.488
(3.274) (0.421)
# Inequ. Av. -4.766 -0.807
(2.945) (0.489)
# Benev. -4.614 -0.761
(3.101) (0.512)
Constant 17.73 11.79
(8.834) (0.934)
Observations 21 21
Adjusted R2 0.087 0.017
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 13: Group e¤ort and Inequality Aversion (omitted category: Desinterested).
and Min-E¤ort Leaders (right panel) for the Chat treatment. As can be seen, Spiteful
individuals have the highest propensity of becoming a Min-E¤ort Leader. While there
are not enough observations for the Disinterested to make any meaningful statement
only 2 out of the 63 subjects in this treatment are Disinterested we see that both
types of Other-Regarding subjects have a lower propensity of becoming a Min-E¤ort
Leader. This is especially so for Inequity Averse subjects. Thus, relative to an
Inequity Averse, a Spiteful subject is 3.3 times more likely to emerge as a Min-E¤ort
Leader.
Finally, controlling for the emergence of a leader, as in Table 5, we can separate
the relation of social preferences and leadership emergence from general e¤ort choices.
Table 14 summarizes the results. Note that we pooled Disinterested with Spiteful
subjects due to the lack of observations for Disinterested in this treatment (i.e.,
only 2 subjects out of 63). Overall the results mirror our results from the main
analysis. Inequity Averse subjects behave similar to Benevolent ones, though we only
get signicance for the Inequity Averse. This could be driven by the lower numbers
of Benevolent subjects.
Conclusion
To summarize, the main results of our two alternative categorizations are:
 Both Substitutes and Complements reduce e¤ort relative to Selsh types. We do
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Figure 10: Distribution of social preferences among non-Min-E¤ort Leaders and Min-
E¤ort Leaders under extended categorization two.
not nd signicant di¤erences in Substitutesand Complementse¤ort choices.
 When communication is possible, Complements are less likely to initiate coop-
eration through chat, while this is not the case for Substitutes.
 There is (weak) evidence that especially Spiteful subjects lead to high group
e¤ort provision. There is not much di¤erence between Benevolent and Inequity
Averse subjects in terms of their e¤ort choices.
 Spiteful subjects are most likely to become leaders, while Inequity Averse sub-
jects are least likely.
 Overall, a simple categorization into Selsh and Other-Regarding explains most
of the variation in the data.
7.3 Appendix B - Subjectively Categorized Collusion
Figure 11 shows the e¤ort choices of groups S4G1, S5G3 and S5G5 that we categorize
as ultimately colluding.Group S5G3 achieves the collusive outcome in the strictest
sense all group members choose minimal e¤ort of 1 in the nal periods. The other
two groups we subjectively categorize as coordinating on low e¤orts.
7.4 Robot Details
For this treatment, we needed to develop a program that would create a similar
experience for a subject playing a computer to if she was instead playing actual
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(1) (2)
E¤ort E¤ort
Period -0.133 (0.0276) -0.0766 (0.0255)
Inequity Averse -0.698 (0.910) -0.682 (0.333)
Benevolent -0.276 (1.523) -0.698 (0.601)
# other Inequity Averse -2.831 (1.679)
# other Benevolent -2.223 (1.721)
Min-E¤ort Leader Exists -5.316 (0.633)
Min-E¤ort Leader 0.149 (0.403)
Constant 7.839 (1.265) 14.61 (3.338)
Observations 1827 1827
R2- within/between .1/.01 .212/.719
Standard errors in parentheses
 p<0.1,  p<0.05,  p<0.01
Table 14: E¤ect of social preferences (extended categorization 2) on individual e¤ort
controling for leadership (Chat treatment).
subjects. By experience we mean if the human subject played certain strategies, she
would obtain similar results whether she played actual subjects or the computer. To
accomplish this, we used actual subject behavior from the No Chat treatment to
determine how the computer would respond to a subjects e¤ort choices in the Robot
treatment. In particular, we had the computer choose e¤ort each period based on
the composition of e¤orts of players in the last period. Although in practice subjects
could use an entire history of play to determine their action for the current period,
regression analysis shows virtually all of historys e¤ect on current choices is captured
in just the last period of play.
Recall each subject can choose e¤orts between 1 and 12. This provides 123, or
1,728 possible e¤ort outcomes for any given period. However, most subjects only
faced a small fraction of all these possible outcomes, or what we refer to as states.
Thus, we collapse the 1,728 to 27 possible states by creating a coarse partition of
e¤orts. In particular, we bucket e¤ort into low (1-4 units), medium (5-8 units), or
high (9-12 units). In addition, we assume a player does not care about the identity
of which player provides a higher e¤ort, should they be di¤erent e¤orts. This reduces
the possible states to 18. With this coarser partition, at least one player faced
each of these possible 18 states in the No Chat treatment. Our next step is to
then build a set of strategies for 63 simulated players, which are based on each of
the 63 actual subjectsactions in the No Chat treatment. For each of the possible
states, we create a transition matrix for each simulated player. The transition
matrix contains the simulated players action for each of the possible 18 statesthey
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Figure 11: Choices of groups classied as colluding.
might face. Often a given subject had historically chosen a di¤erent action when
facing the same state.In this case, we assign a probability for taking each action
based on the historical likelihood of the human subject choosing each action. In the
event a subject did not face a given state in the No Chat treatment, we impute
the simulated subjects action as the average action of all players that faced such a
state.The 13 (of 63) subjects who faced the smallest number of statesresponded
to just 3 statesand the subject who faced the most states,reacted to 11 states
(out of 18). The mean of di¤erent statesfaced by a given subject was 5.2 and the
median was 4. In the end, after imputation, we had created a complete transition
matrix that assigned likelihood of each action for each of the 18 states" for all 63
simulated subjects.
For the robot treatment, when subjects reached the relative performance stage,
they were randomly assigned to two simulated subjects (out of the possible 63) that
would react to the past periods e¤orts based on the transition matrix. For the rst
period, however, the selected simulated subject simply chose the same e¤ort as the
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corresponding human subject did in the No Chat treatment for the rst period of the
relative performance stage.
Before running our experiment, we wanted to make sure the simulated subjects
behavior resembled real subjects. Again, for this treatment, we were attempting to
turn o¤ social preferences by presenting subjects with the same play experience
as when facing real subjects but without generating any negative externality against
the payo¤s of their opponents. We performed two tests to check for the validity of
our simulated subjects (i.e., robots). First, we matched the simulated subjects into
the same group pairings that the human subjects experienced. For each of these 21
groups, we then ran 1000 repetitions of each group interacting over 29 periods. Table
15 reports the result of this simulation. A very common outcome for the human
subjects was for groups to end with all players choosing high e¤orts. In fact, four
groups all chose maximal e¤ort of 12 in the nal period. When these four group
pairings are instead played by simulated players, they end up with this maximal
outcome 95%, 91%, 71%, and 23% of the time. They all end up in the state
of (high, high, high) e¤ort (i.e., all players choosing e¤ort above 8), 60-97% of the
time. In terms of the extreme outcome of e¤ort depression, colluding on e¤ort choices
of (1,1,1), there is only one group of human subjects that achieved this. This one
group represents 5% of all human subject groups. The simulated group of these same
members ends with (1,1,1) 7% of the time and the state(low,low,low) e¤ort roughly
13% of the time. In contrast, this same group ends at highest e¤orts of (12,12,12)
just .6% of the time.
A second test we conducted was to simply randomly match all simulated subjects
into groups of three and then compare the distribution of these group outcomes to the
distribution of actual group outcomes of human subjects in the No Chat treatment.
Table 16 reports these ndings. We did this in a series of 100, 1,000, and 10,000
repetitions of group pairings. While again just one group, or 5%, of human subject
groups colluded, in our largest samples, we found 1% of simulated groups perfectly
colluded (i.e. ended up in (1,1,1) e¤orts). In terms of maximal e¤ort, whereas 19%
of human subject groups ended with choosing (12,12,12), 17% of randomly matched
robot groups experienced the same ending. For the common outcome of human
subjects nishing in groups with e¤ort choices of (high,high,high) (i.e., e¤ort all higher
than 8), human subjects achieved this 43% of the time versus the robot groups did
so 49% of the time. Although, frequencies are not identical to the realized draw of
21 human subject groups, we were comforted by these simulations that these robots
reasonably resemble human subject behavior.
7.5 Leader Classication Details
Attached le
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% of the time in which the robotsnished in:
Group Final e¤ort all 12 all < 4 2:< 4, 1:12 all > 8 all 1 2:> 8 1: 4
S4G1 12,1,1 0.002 0.235 0.181 0.245 0.126 0.124
S4G2 6,12,12 0.083 0.002 0 0.57 0 0.033
S4G3 9,9,12 0.251 0 0 0.871 0 0
S4G4 12,5,12 0.464 0.003 0.002 0.636 0.001 0.029
S4G5 12,12,10 0.751 0 0 0.838 0 0.117
S4G6 12,10,12 0.028 0 0 0.966 0 0
S4G7 12,4,11 0.173 0.004 0.014 0.211 0 0.099
S5G1 10,9,11 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.574 0 0.004
S5G2 12,12,8 0.03 0.044 0.021 0.07 0.013 0.084
S5G3 1,1,1 0.006 0.129 0 0.472 0.071 0.016
S5G4 12,4,12 0 0 0 0 0 0.168
S5G5 2,3,2 0.091 0.25 0.002 0.124 0 0.008
S5G6 12,12,12 0.231 0.001 0.036 0.604 0.001 0.219
S5G7 11,12,5 0.037 0.003 0.003 0.084 0.001 0.088
S6G1 12,12,12 0.952 0 0 0.973 0 0.027
S6G2 7,8,12 0.313 0 0 0.683 0 0
S6G3 12,5,4 0.035 0.009 0.002 0.125 0.003 0.037
S6G4 12,12,1 0.015 0 0.062 0.098 0 0.833
S6G5 12,12,12 0.707 0 0 0.722 0 0.032
S6G6 12,12,12 0.907 0 0 0.971 0 0.029
S6G7 9,9,9 0.013 0 0 0.913 0 0.044
Table 15: Simulations (1000 repetitions of each group).
Simulations
Last round e¤ort % Human % Robot (100) % Robot (1000) % Robot (10000)
all 12 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.19
all  4 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.02
2:  4, 1: 12 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.01
all > 8 0.43 0.49 0.53 0.53
all 1 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01
2: > 8, 1:  4 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.06
Table 16: Randomly matched groups (simulations).
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7.6 Instructions for Subjects
Attached le
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